

# REDD in UNFCCC negotiations

## Methodological Aspects

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# REDD in Negotiation

- COP 11, Montreal 2005: PNG and Costa Rica statements lead to issue being included in the agenda
- 2006: Submissions on incentives, policy, and technical and methodological issues
- SBSTA 23, Bonn 2006: TORs for First Workshop
- 1st UNFCCC Workshop on REDD, Rome 2006: Parties' thoughts and initial proposals
- COP12/MOP2, Nairobi 2006: TORs for Second Workshop
- 2nd UNFCCC Workshop on REDD, Cairns: Zooming in on the base issues



# Methodological Issues:

## I. As seen in NAI GHG Inventories

- At least seven Parties noted difficulties in applying the IPCC Inventory Guidelines for LUCF (Antigua, Chile, Colombia, Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Tonga).
- About half of NAI Parties report lacking access to important activity data for inventory development. References were found in twenty-six NAI NCs regarding limited availability of data on forest cover and land use change.
- The need for better access to and quality of forest cover data is mentioned both in the context of GHG inventory development and in improving capacity to identify and remedy deforestation trends. There is a need for both remote sensing and ground-based inventories.

# Issues: II. From Parties

- **Timing:**

- Methodological issues should be discussed only after policy and incentive issues are addressed: Coalition1, Costa Rica1, Indonesia1, LA1, Mexico2
- Methodological issues should be discussed simultaneously with policy and incentive issues: COMIFAC1, Korea1
- Discussion on methodological issues should not stall or delay the negotiation process: Coalition1, Costa Rica1, COMIFAC1

- **Scale:**

- National scale: Coalition1&2, Australia2, Brazil2, Dominican Republic2, EU2, Nepal2, Vanatu2
- Project based (flexible): Costa Rica1, LA1, Malaysia2, Mexico2
- Regional/sub-national: Coalition1, COMIFAC1
- Sectoral: COMIFAC1

COMIFAC1: Congo Basin Countries; Coalition1: CfRFN- Bolivia, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, PNG; Cent Am1: Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras; LA1: Peru, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru

- **Definitions:**

- Devegetation should be taken into account: Bolivia<sup>1</sup>

- Use of IPCC GPG definitions: Coalition<sup>1</sup>

- Should include:

- Selective logging/ sust. for. management: Coalition<sup>1</sup>, Dominican Rep<sup>2</sup>

- Degradation: Coalition<sup>1</sup>, COMIFAC

- Should take into account national circumstances: Cent Am<sup>1</sup>

- Should allow for all Party participation: COMIFAC<sup>1</sup>, Indonesia<sup>1</sup>, LA<sup>1</sup>

- Can be country specific: Australia<sup>2</sup>, Brazil<sup>2</sup>, Thailand<sup>2</sup>, Nepal<sup>2</sup>

- Use of biomes: COMIFAC<sup>1</sup>, Brazil<sup>2</sup>

- South Africa<sup>2</sup>: forests are characterized by an appreciable cover of trees, but could preferably be defined by a minimum potential standing biomass per unit area which aggregates to a minimum carbon density value at the landscape scale, rather than a minimum tree cover or tree height cut-off.



## •Baseline:

- Should take into account historical trends: Coalition1, Costa Rica1, COMIFAC1, LA1, Brazil2
- Should take into account national circumstances: Coalition1, Costa Rica1, COMIFAC1, Cent Am1, LA1
- Should not disadvantage early action: Coalition1, Costa Rica1, COMIFAC1, LA1
- Could use global deforestation baseline: Cent Am1
- Could be difficult at national level: Norway1
- Setting a cap by estimating emission reduction target: Indonesia2

## •Additionality:

- Fairness: EU1
- Not penalize early action: EU1
- Interannual variability should be taken into account: EU1



- **Leakage:**

- National scope to address leakage: EU1&2, Coalition1

- International leakage:

- Can be addressed by including all relevant parties: EU1, Bolivia1

- Not an issue for other sectors, shouldn't be an issue for REDD: Coalition1

- Different types of leakage should be addressed in different manners: Bolivia1

- Can be calculated at project level: Bolivia1 (NK)

- Can be calculated at national level: Bolivia1, Coalition1

- **Permanence:**

- Natural events should be taken into account: EU1

- Options for addressing permanence EU2:

- (a) using temporary credits in a manner similar to the current A/R CDM projects,

- (b) reducing future financial incentives to take account of deforestation emissions above the agreed level,

- (c) bank credits and debits from one period to another, or (d) by mandatory banking of a share of the emission reductions.

- **Remote Sensing as tool for REDD methodologies:**

- Mention of importance: EU1, Bolivia1, Coalition1, Indonesia1, Norway1, Thailand2

- Issues:

- Detection of forest loss short of deforestation=degradation: EU1
    - Estimation of forest biomass: EU1
    - Cost effectiveness and accuracy: Indonesia1
    - Degradation hard to monitor: Thailand2
    - There are not any previous satellite based land cover/forest monitoring studies of any significance: Vanatu2
    - Continuous optical observations are challenged by persistent cloud cover: Vanatu2
    - Basic/limited satellite coverage: Vanatu2
    - Mountainous topography complicates image interpretation and mapping process: Vanatu2
  - Need for it's use in combination with ground-based techniques: EU1&2, Norway1, Indonesia2, Vanatu2





- **Consideration of CDM in REDD:**
  - EU1, LA2, Chile2, Japan2: CDM experience should be taken into account
  - Japan1, Malaysia2: concern about double counting with AR
  - Malaysia: REDD mechanism should not negatively affect AR CDM
  - Indonesia2: REDD mechanism could complement A/R CDM
  - Mexico2, Colombia2: Inclusion of REDD in the CDM for second commitment period
  - Tuvalu2: market mechanisms, including the CDM would not achieve the necessary guarantees for an effective and long lasting regime to avoid emissions from deforestation.
- **Use of IPCC parameters in REDD methodological issues: EU1&2, Bolivia1, Coalition2, Thailand2, Vanatu2**
- **Consistency with/use of IPCC GPG: Australia2, Coalition2, Japan2, Indonesia2**

- **Coordination with GHG national inventories: Australia<sup>1</sup>, USA<sup>1</sup>**
- **Monitoring and reporting:**
  - every 5 years: Cent Am<sup>1</sup>, Tuvalu<sup>2</sup>
  - Spatially explicit: Australia<sup>2</sup>
  - Should be Tier 3: Australia<sup>2</sup>
  - Standardized: Australia<sup>2</sup>
  - Should be developed focusing on land-use change as well as land-cover change: Japan<sup>2</sup>
- **Party capacity for monitoring and reporting EDD:**
  - Need for capacity development: EU<sup>1</sup>, Norway<sup>1</sup>, Cent Am<sup>1</sup>, Australia<sup>2</sup>, Dom Rep<sup>2</sup>, Thailand<sup>2</sup>, Malaysia<sup>2</sup>, Nepal<sup>2</sup>
  - Sharing experience: EU<sup>1&2</sup>

Coalition<sup>2</sup>: CfRFN- Bolivia, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Panama, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Vanatu

- **Cost effectiveness: Australia2, Coalition2, Thailand2**
- **Consider involvement of private sector: Australia2**
- **Methodology for including carbon savings in wood products should be developed and policy devised to include this: Thailand2**
- **Carbon stocks, particularly soil, should also be accounted for: Thailand2**



# Key Issues: Open for discussion

- Scale:  
Project based

Pros	Cons
Money goes to landowners incurring opportunity costs	Less area participating?
Leakage can be addressed through methodology design	Leakage concern
Easy fit with market mechanisms including the CDM – use of existing infrastructure and carbon market	
Real benefit to climate if used to decrease AI commitments?	Increase in AI commitments, caps
Flexible: each country chooses its level of commitment and the way to address REDD	Less area participating globally

# Key Issues: Open for discussion

- Scale:  
National

Pros	Cons
National leakage accounted for automatically	Leakage will happen, it will just be accounted for
Incentive for government action/policies	Would money get to landowners that incur the opportunity costs efficiently?
Economy of scale in methodology application	Hard to monitor degradation
	Problematic fit with markets and private sector participation?
More areas participating	Problematic for countries with violence and/or governability problems

- Compromise in scale possible?
- How do these fit with incentive mechanisms?  
Markets/Funds
- Definitions: degradation, forest
- What emissions should be accounted for?
  - CO2 only vs other GHG



# Thank you!

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